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LABOR LAW 
I. APPLICATION OF THE ALL WRITS ACT TO OSHA 
INSPECTIONS 
A. THE CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 
Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton! 
Plum Creek Lumber Co. is a Minnesota corporation with 
manufacturing facilities for lumber, plywood, and fiberboard in 
Columbia Falls, Montana. On January 17, 1978, an OSHA Com-
pliance Officer making a routine inspection following an explo-
sion observed conditions and practices unrelated to the explo-
sion which appeared to violate OSHA standards.s The 
Compliance Officer also received one oral and two written com-
plaints about working conditions by employees in the fiberboard 
plant.s Based on information in the Compliance Officer's report, 
a complete health and safety inspection was ordered for the Co-
lumbia Falls plant.4 
Inspectors arrived at the plant and announced that they 
would be inspecting the fiberboard plant, the plywood plant, and 
the sawmill, and that they would be asking employees to wear 
. dosimeters and air samplers.5 The Inspectors were told that 
1. 608 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979) (per Kilkenny, J.; the other panel members were 
Hufstedler, J. and Grant, D.J., sitting by designation). 
2. Brief for Appellant at 10 n.10, Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283 
(8th Cir. 1979) ("I observed electrical fixtures and wiring which appeared to be either 
unsafe or unsuited for the conditions in which they were used; excessive concentrations 
of fiber dust and poor housekeeping. I detected concentrations of formaldehyde and 
what may be excessive noise levels."). 
3. 29 U.S.C. § 657(£)(1) (1976) states that "[a]ny employees or representative of em-
ployees who believe that a violation of a safety or health standard exists that threatens 
physical harm, or that an imminent danger exists, may request an inspection by giving 
notice to the Secretary [of Labor] or his authorized representative of such violation or 
danger." 
4. The Secretary of Labor is required to perform an inspection if he "determines 
there are reasonable grounds to believe a violation of a health or safety standard exists 
that threatens physical harm, or that an imminent danger exists." Id. 
5. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.7(b) (1978) states: "Compliance Safety and Health Officers shall 
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their inspection would be limited to the fiberboard plant where 
the complaints arose, and, due to a safety policy of the company, 
employees would not be allowed to wear the testing devices.s 
The Inspectors terminated their inspection. 
An inspection warrant was obtained which authorized in-
spection "including air sampling and noise level testing in a rea-
sonable manner and to a reasonable extent, [of] the workplaces 
or environments where work is performed."? Before the warrant 
was executed, Plum Creek Lumber filed a complaint in the dis-
trict court which alleged that the noise sampling and air testing 
equipment was unreliable and dangerous. The district court is-
sued a temporary restraining order pending a hearing. At the 
hearing the court refused to extend the temporary restraining 
order, but allowed Plum Creek Lumber to continue its policy 
against employee participation in testing.s 
When the OSHA Industrial Hygenists made their inspec-
tion, they asked twenty-two employees to wear the testing de-
tion, employ other reasonable investigative techniques, question privately any employer, 
owner, operator, or employee of an establishment." 
According to the OSHA inspection guidelines, standard procedure requires two 
types of measurement for asseSBing an employee's exposure to noise. "The audio dosime-
ter determines the full shift exposure and the results are the basis of citation. The sound 
level meter verifies the audio dosimeter's results. A minimum of ten sound level meter 
measUreme~tS are necessary throughout the workshift to represent each personal expo-
sure." Reply Brief for Appellant at A-4, Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 
1283 (9th Cir. 1979). 
A dosimeter is a device designed to measure varying 
sound levels over a period of time. Sounds enter a microphone, 
are measured and recorded on a memory cell. The device is 
approximately the size of a pack of cigarettes, with a wire ex-
tending from the main unit to a microphone about the size of 
a quarter. The main unit may be attached to the employee's 
belt or pocket, and the microphone to the shirt label. The con-
necting wire may be attached to the employee's clothing. 
A personal air contaminant sampler is a battery operated 
pump, approximately the size of two packs of cigarettes. It is 
worn in a manner similar to a dosimeter, except that it has a 
flexible hose and silver dollar sized in place of a wire and 
microphone. 
608 F.2d at 1285 n.1. 
6. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.7(c) (1978) states: "Compliance Officers shall comply with all 
employer safety and health rules and practices at the establishment being 
inspected ..•. " 
7. 608 F.2d at 1285. 
8.Id. 
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vices. Only three employees eventually participated in the tests. 
Most of the employees based their refusal on the fact that com-
pany policy forbade cooperation.9 Because of the low employee 
participation, the investigation of noise and air contamination 
problems was inconclusive. 
Subsequent to the inspection, OSHA filed an answer and a 
counterclaim seeking to enjoin Plum Creek from interfering with 
the OSHA inspection through its policy proscribing employee 
cooperation. The district court noted that there was little chance 
that the testing devices posed a safety hazard.Io However, the 
court also noted that there were other methods of testing, and 
even though the method in question was the most reasonable, 
the court held that in the absence of a specific law, it did not 
have the authority to subject Plum Creek to any possible addi-
tional safety risks.11 
Noblecraft Industries Inc. v. Secretary of Labor12 
Plaintiff is an employer engaged in the same types of lum-
ber processing and manufacturing of wood products as Plum 
9. Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 452 F. Supp. 575, 576 (D. Mont. 1978). The 
notice stated: 
It is the intention of Plum Creek to cooperate with these rep-
resentative personnel so long as their activities do not unrea-
sonably jeopardize the health or safety of our employees or 
interfere with your work. In this regard, it is unlikely that 
OSHA representatives will approach selected employees and 
request that these employees wear noise and air contamina-
tion sampling devices upon their person while performing 
their normal duties. A Federal District Court Judge in Mis-
soula, ruled on Feb. 9, 1978, that you are not required to wear 
these devices. In the opinion of Plum Creek management, the 
wearing of noise and air sampling devices will create an unrea-
sonable and unnecessary safety hazard for employees and in-
terfere with your work • . • The company policy is that em-
ployees will not wear these devices and the company takes full 
responsibility for your decision not to wear them. 
Brief for Appellant at 13, Plum Creek Lumber v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979). 
10. At the hearing, the Plum Creek Safety Officer and the fiberboard division man-
ager testified that the dosimeter and personal air sampler were dangerous methods of 
testing. On cross-examination both men admitted that they had never heard. of anyone 
being injured by wearing a dosimeter, that they had never seen one before, and that they 
had no idea how it operated. Brief for Appellant at 14, Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hut-
ton, 608 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979). ~ 
11. Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 452 F. Supp. 575, 577. (D. Mont. 1978). 
12. 614 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Merrill, J.: the other panel members were 
Goodwin, J. and Schnacke, D.J., sitting by designation). 
3
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Creek. In the course of an OSHA inspection, a Compliance Of-
ficer took several very ~Ihort noise level readings on a hand-held 
dosimeter while machilllery in the plant was idling. Each reading 
was for thirty seconds or less. Based on these readings, the Com-
pliance Officer computed the level of noise employees were ex-
posed to over an eight hour shift, and cited plaintiff with viola-
tion of the OSHA "noise standard."lS 
In its appeal, plailntiff contended that the Compliance Of-
ficer's computation did not take into account the fact that some 
of the machinery was occasionally shut down. The court noted 
that the noise level often fluctuated far above idling level during 
the course of the work shift, and concluded that "the citation 
was supported by substantial evidence. "l4 
The question herE~ presented is how far the Ninth Circuit 
will go in aiding OSHA, an administrative agency, in the per-
formance of its duties. 111 
13. Occupational Noise Eltposure, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95 (1978). 
(a) Protection against the effects of noise exposure shall 
be provided when the sound levels exceed those shown in Ta-
ble G-16 when measured on the A scale of a standard sound 
level meter at slow response • • • . 
(b) (1) When employees are subjected to sound exceeding 
those listed in Table G-16, feasible administrative or engineer-
ing controls shall be utilized. If such controls fail to reduce 
sound levels within the levels of Table G-16, personal protec-
tive equipment shall be provided and used to reduce sound 
levels within the levels of the table. 
Table G-16 - PERMISSmLE NOISE EXPOSURES 
Duration per day, Sound level dBA 
hours slow response 
8 ............................................... 90 
6 ............................................... 92 
4 ............................................... 95 
3 ............................................... 97 
2 ............................................... 100 
11f2 ......•.••••••.•...•••••••••.••.•••.•.•...•.• 102 
1 ............................................... 105 
Ih .............................................. 110 
~ or less ........................................ 115 
14. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1976) provides: "The findings of the [Occupational Safety 
and Health Review] Commisuion with respect to questions of fact, if supported by sub-
stantial evidence on the record considered as whole, shall be conclusive." See Todd Ship-
yards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 568 F.2d 683, 685 n.4 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Because there 
is no factual issue before [the court] the Commissioner's orders must be affirmed."); 
Brennan v. OSHRC, 511 F.2d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 1975). 
15. It is accepted procedure for a federal court to grant relief to aid an administra-
4
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B. BACKGROUND 
The All Writs Act (The Act) is a tool which enables courts 
to issue any orders necessary to the preservation and protection 
of their jurisdiction.16 The Act has been used to convey jurisdic-
tion over those who, although not parties to an action, are in a 
position to frustrate an order of the COurt,17 including those non-
parties who have not taken any action to hinder justice but are 
in a position to do SO.18 Because the federal courts are courts of 
limited jurisdiction, the Act is an indispensible tool used by the 
courts to bring controversies to their final conclusion, an "essen-
tial step in the administration of justice."19 However, "conduct 
not shown to be detrimental to the court's jurisdiction or exer-
cise thereof, could not be enjoined under the Act. "20 
tive agency in the performance of its investigative duties. Marshall v. Able Contractors, 
573 F.2d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 1978); see also Island Airlines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 352 F.2d 735, 
744 (9th Cir. 1965) (Injunctive relief will be granted to the United States "to prevent 
interference with the means it adopts to exercise its powers of government and carry into 
effect its policies."). 
16. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1656 (1976). [d. § 1651(a) states: "The Supreme Court and all 
courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid 
of their respective jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." Sec-
tion 1651 was consolidation of §§ 342, 376, and 377 of Title 28. Section 377 provided in 
part: "The Supreme Court, the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the district courts shall 
have power to issue all writs not specifically provided for by statute, which may be neces-
sary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions. • .. " 
17. Board of Educ. v. York, 429 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 
(1971) (order issued requiring parents to send their child to a particular school in fur-
therance of a school desegregation plan). 
18. United States v. McHie, 196 F. 586 (N.D. ill. 1912) (a federal court has the 
power to impound books and papers as evidence in a trial even if the property of third 
parties, when they are shown to be essential to the outcome of the case in a criminal 
action. . 
19. Adams v. United States e% rei. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 273 (1942) ("A federal 
court may avail itself of all auxiliary writs as aids in the performance of its duties, when 
the use of such historic aids is calculated in its sound judgment to achieve the ends of 
justice intrusted to it."). See, e.g., Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969) where the Su-
preme Court overturned a Ninth Circuit ruling and held that a lower court could use the 
AlI Writs Act to compel the answering of interrogatories in a habeas corpus proceeding. 
The Court held that when there were no alternative methods of discovering the truth, it 
was "the duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an ade-
quate inquiry." [d. at 300. See also E% parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920), where the 
Court determined that it had the inherent authority to hire an auditor when the case 
could not be resolved without one. 
20. ITT Community Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th Cir. 1978). The 
court overturned a district court order for a prejudgment writ of garnishment, where the 
case was not an action to recover on a debt, there was no showing of a great likelihood of 
recovery, and no indication that there would be a problem in enforcing any final order. 
The court stated, "[i]t must be shown that the writ was directed at conduct which, left 
5
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In In re United States,21 the Ninth Circuit ruled that fed-
eral courts did not have the authority to issue a writ ordering 
the telephone company to provide technical assistance to the 
F.B.I. in a court authorized wiretap. The court held that the 
Omnibus Crime Control Act,22 which authorized the wiretap in 
question and the devices being used, did not give the court the 
statutory authority to order the assistance over the phone com-
pany's refusal to cooperate. The court believed that it would 
subject the company to criminal prosecution if it issued-and 
the company obeyed-the writ. The court also noted that it was 
possible for the F.B.I. to carry out the wiretap without telephone 
company assistance and, therefore, the court did not have the 
inherent authority to issue the order.28 
In cases involving similar factual situations in other federal 
districts, the courts have held that once the district court grants 
an order directing the telephone company to furnish facilities 
and technical assistance, the appeals courts would not reverse.24 
The courts in these circuits have held that once an order based 
on probable cause was validly issued by a district court, that 
court had the inherent power to order the telephone company to 
provide technical assistance/.lI~ 
In United States v. New York Telephone, the Supreme 
unchecked, would have bad the practical effect of diminishing the court's power to bring 
the litigation to a natural conclusion." [d. at 1359 (quoting Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S. 
132, 149-50 (1949». 
21. 427 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1970). 
22. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 
(1970). 
23. In reaction to the Ninth Circuit's decision, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2(a}(ii}, 
which made it legal for a common carrier to assist law enforcement officials, and 18 
U.S.C. § 2518, authorizing federal courts to grant writs ordering technical assistance if 
compensation is given. 
24. Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977); United 
States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243 {8th Cir. 1976}; United States v. llli-
nois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976). 
25. Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385, 389 (6th Cir. 1977) 
("Without assistance. . • an entire. • • investigation grounded on probable cause would 
be nullified."); United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243, 246 (8th Cir. 
1976) ("To hold other (sic) otherwise would effectively allow the telephone company 
rather than the district court to decide when pen register surveillance should be used."); 
United States v. lllinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 814 (7th Cir. 1976) ("The authority 
to 'compel cooperation of the telephone company is concomitant of the power to search, 
because the telephone company could not frustrate the exercise of the district court's 
order by refusing to cooperate."). 
6
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Court then granted certiorari to a Second Circuit decision strik-
ing down a district court order directing the telephone company 
to furnish facilities and technical assistance to the F.B.I. 28 The 
Court reinstated the district court order based on the statutory 
authority of the district court under the All Writs Act rather 
than inherent authority. The Supreme Court noted the congres-
sional reaction to the Ninth Circuit decision in In re United 
States, and interpreted that reaction to imply that Congress, in 
amending the Omnibus Crime Control Act, contemplated the 
type of order granted by the district court and, therefore, under 
the All Writs· Act, the court had the power to issue a writ it 
deemed necessary to its jurisdiction.27 The Supreme Court 
stated that "no distinction is to be made between orders in aid 
of a court's own jurisdiction, and orders designed to better en-
able a party to effectuate his rights and duties. "2S 
Until 1978, warrants were not mandated for OSHA inspec-
tions. In Marshall v. Barlows,29 the Supreme Court held that an 
OSHA inspection was a search, and therefore warrants were re-
quired. The Court noted that to justify an administrative search, 
"probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be 
based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but 
also on a showing that 'reasonable legislative or administrative 
standards for conducting an. . . inspection are satisfied with re-
spect to a particular [establishment].' "30 This decision has been 
interpreted by lower courts to imply that they had the authority 
to issue warrants for OSHA inspections pursuant to the Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Act of 1970,31 and a complaint by an 
employee plus statements of an OSHA inspector were enough to 
support a warrant.3S In addition, 29 C.F.R. 1903.4(d) authorizes 
the Secretary of Labor to obtain a warrant for inspection in an 
26. United States v. New York TeL, 434 U.S. 159 (1977). In this case, the F.B.I. had 
requested that the telephone company lease the necessary lines so that wiretapping de-
vices could be installed and used undetected. The telephone company refused and ad-
vised the F.B.I. to string a separate set of cables from the "subject apartment." 
27. In In re United States Order Authorizing Use of Pen Register, 538 F.2d 956, 961 
(2d Cir. 1976), the court noted in dictum that "the [All Writs] Act, even if found to be 
applicable here, is entirely permissive in nature; it in no way mandates a particular result 
or the entry of a particular order." 
28. United States v. New York TeL, 434 U.S. at 175. 
29. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
30. Id. at 320 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967». 
31. Marshall v. Huffhines Steel Co., 7 OSHC 1850 (N.D. Tex. 1979). 
32. Marshall v. W & W Steel Co., 604 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1979). 
7
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ex parte application without notic~.88 
The courts have generally limited the scope of OSHA in-
spection warrants to those specific areas about which the em-
ployees complained.a., One recent decision denied OSHA Com-
pliance Officers the right to interview employees when 
interviews were not specified on the face of the warrant.81S 
C. THE REASONING OF THE COURT 
Plum Creek Lumber 
In Plum Creek Lumber, the district court refused to grant 
OSHA's request for an order directing Plum Creek to rescind its 
policy proscribing employee cooperation with the air sampling 
, and noise testing.86 Plum Creek had claimed that the devices in 
question posed a safety hazard because their use could distract 
employees.87 Plum Creek also argued that the dosimeters were 
not required by statute,86 and, therefore, the court did not have 
the authority to order Plum Creek's cooperation. 
OSHA argued that it had a statutory duty to inspect work-
places and issue cRtations specifically describing safety and 
health violations.89 'ro facilitate the performance of this duty, 
OSHA is given the authority to "consult with employees con-
cerning matters of 0 ccupational safety and health to the extent 
33. Id. at 1326: Marshall v. Trinity Indus., 7 OSHC 1851, 1854' (W.D. Okla. 1979). 
34. See In re Central Mine Equip. Co., 7 OSHC 1185 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (warrant must 
set a time limit on scope of the investigation): Marshall v. Pool Offshore Co., 467 F. 
Supp. 978 (W.D. La. 1979) (warrant based on employee's complaint limited to that per-
son's employer even though other employers share the same construction site); Marshall 
v. Trinity Indus., 7 OSHC 1851 (W.D. Olda. 1978) (warrant authorizing wall to wall 
search based on employee complaint concerning one area struck down as overly broad). 
35. Marshall v. Wollaston Alloys Inc., [1979] 9 OSHR (BNA) 629 (D.C. Mass. 1979). 
36. Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 452 F. Supp. 575 (D. Mont. 1978). 
37. The company safety director testified at the hearing that one employee who had 
worn the device was distracted by the testing and hit twice by boards where he was 
working. On cross-examination the officer admitted that he had no first-hand knowledge 
of the accident, that no injury resulted, and that though he knew the employee had been 
distracted, it was "virtually all assumption" that the OSHA devices were responsible. ' 
Brief for Appellant at 16 n.14, Plum Creek Lumber v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 
1979). 
38. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95(a) (1980) requires a standard Bound level meter at slow re-
sponse. The OSHA Compliance Officers were attempting to use the dosimeters in con-
junction with a standard sound level meter to verify the results. See note 5 supra. 
39. 29 U.S.C. §§ 657(a), 658(a), 659(a) (1976). 
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they deem necessary,"40 to "take environmental samples ... re-
lated to the purpose of the inspection, [and] employ other rea-
sonable investigative techniques. "41 OSHA argued that although 
having the employees wear the devices was not the only possible 
method of making the tests, it was the most practical and the 
most accurate. The Supreme Court had already stated that the 
All Writs Act was not limited to cases of strict necessity. Rather, 
it is a legislatively approved source of procedural instruments 
designed to achieve the rational ends of law!2 
The court reached three factual conclusions in deciding not 
to issue the writ. First, the court concluded that the dosimeter 
and the personal air sampler were reasonable methods of testing 
and were allowable under the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1970, but that those particular devices were not required 
by law.43 Second, the court looked to see whether Plum Creek 
was taking an action which had the effect of hindering the fact 
finding inquiry. The court was unable to find that Plum Creek 
had intentionally changed conditions to impede the inspection." 
Third, the court determined that there were other methods of 
taking noise level readings and air samples, and, therefore, the 
court was able to reach a conclusion on the facts without requir-
ing Plum Creek to provide assistance.45 
The court concluded that the safety factor, however slight, 
outweighed any argument by OSHA that this was the best 
method of testing.46 
40. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.10 (1980). 
41. Ide § 1903.7(b) (1980). 
42. Price V. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 282 (1948). See, e.g., United States V. New York 
TeL Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977) (F.B.I. probably could have instaIIed their equipment with-
out the aid of the telephone company); Adams V. United States ex rei. McCann, 317 U.S. 
269 (1942) (affirming decision to issue writ of habeas corpus even though not strictly 
necessary for the exercise of its duties when its use as an aid was reasonably necessary in 
the interests of justice). 
43. 452 F. Supp. at 577. 
44. ld. 
45. ld. The Court suggested two possible alternatives: in the "area method," a sta-
tionary sampler is placed in an area of high noise or fumes and measures the levels for 
the area; the second method is to have an OSHA Compliance Officer wear the devices 
and move around with the workers in the course of the workday. 
46. United States V. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 189 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
("The fact that a party may be better able to effectuate its rights or duties if a writ is 
issued never has been, and under the language of the statute, cannot be, a sufficient basis 
for issuance of the writ."). See, e.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974) where a 
9
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On its appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Secretary made two 
arguments: that the district court had the statutory authority 
under the All Writs Act to issue the requested order, and that 
the court also had the inherent authority to order Plum Creek to 
provide cooperation in the interest of bringing the case to its 
logical conclusion. 
The statutory authority argument was based on the recent 
Supreme Court decision in New York Telephone. The court dis-
tinguished New York Telephone from Plum Creek on several 
grounds. New York Telephone involved a company that was a 
highly regulated monopoly, and an investigatory method specifi-
cally approved by Congress. The F.B.I. in New York Telephone 
could have made their wiretap without telephone company assis-
tance, but their ability to do so without detection would have 
been severely curtailed. Safety was not as issue, and the tele-
phone company was being paid to provide a service similar to its 
normal customer service. The court believed that this was differ-
ent from requiring a private employer to rescind a safety ordi-
nance in order to use a reasonable and approved method, but 
one not required by statute.4 'l 
In support of the argument that the court had the inherent 
authority to order Plum Creek to provide assistance, the Secre-
tary cited United States v. Southwestern Bell Telephone CO.4B 
and United States IJ. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.49 The court 
distinguished these and similar cases because they were "con-
cerned with enlisting the aid of telephone companies to conduct 
electronic surveillance of criminal activity."I5O The court then re-
affirmed the decision of the district court. 
Noblecraft 
In Noblecraft, the OSHA Compliance Officer used a much 
lower court issued a temporary restraining order for a probationary government em-
ployee who had been discharged pending an appeal to the Civil Service Commission. The 
Supreme Court held the lower court could not rule until the administrative decision to 
discharge did in fact fail to conform to the regulations, and until the decision was final, 
no court was in a position to judge. 
47. 608 F.2d at 1289. 
48. 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976). 
49. 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976). 
50. 608 F.2d at 1290. 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 13
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss1/13
1981] LABOR LAW 371 
different method of testing. The Officer went into the work area 
and took several short meter readings on a hand-held dosimeter 
while all the machinery was idlfug. The Officer then interviewed 
several employees to determine how long they were in the area 
each day. Based on this evidence, plaintiff was cited for a viola-
tion of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95, the noise standard. The citation was 
upheld by the Occupational Health and Safety Review Commis-
sion, and plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 
The court noted that the citation issued by OSHA was sup-
ported by substantial evidence, and dismissed the complaint on 
this ground.1S1 
D. CONCLUSION 
The district court's three part analysis in Plum Creek ap-
pears to be the correct method of analyzing whether a court 
should issue a writ compelling assistance to a governmental 
agency in fact finding inquiries. First, a court must determine 
whether or not a particular investigatory method or device is re-
quired by statute or regulation. H so, then the writ, if necessary, 
should issue under the authority of the All Writs Act when the 
party refuses to cooperate. 
Second, if an individual is blocking the fact finding inquiry, 
either through action or inaction, that conduct has the practical 
'effect of lessening the court's jurisdiction. Therefore, under the 
All Writs Act, the court has the power to issue a writ to stop the 
conduct from interfering with the court's exercise of its 
jurisdiction. 
Third, if the court finds that an individual's actions are hav-
ing the practical effect of inhibiting the court's ability to bring 
controversies to a conclusion, then that court has the inherent 
ability to issue any writs it deems necessarY. H the court is able 
to conclude the proceedings without the use of a writ, however, 
then it must do so. 
The district court applied all three questions to the facts in 
Plum Creek and determined that it would "not issue the writ. 
This appears to create an additional burden for OSHA which 
51. 614 F.2d at 205. 
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has the burden of proof when its citations are contested. liS It is 
undisputed that using personal samplers attached to employees 
over the course of thE~ working day is the most accurate method 
of testing. 
The district court mentioned two possible solutions that 
might be acceptable to the court: the stationary area sampler, 
and having an OSHA Officer wear the devices and follow the 
employees during the course of their workday. Noblecraft of-
fered a third method: taking a few very short samples and coup-
ling them with ,proof through testimony as to exactly how long 
the employees are subjected to the particular noise in question. 
The courts, having denied OSHA the best method of inspection, 
appear ready to accept a lower standard of proof when the em-
ployer rejects use of the most accurate methods. 
When the Ninth Circuit in In re United States refused to 
issue a writ ordering the telephone company to provide assis-
tance, it based its decision on the fact that there was no statu-
tory authority. Soon afterward, Congress amended the statute to 
include such authority. liB In Plum Creek, the court came to a 
similar conclusion. It is unlikely that Congress will respond in 
the same manner. In the cases involving telephone company as-
sistance, the courts were involved with enforcing criminal sanc-
tions. The methods used by the F.B.I. had already been specifi-
cally approved by Congress and were not the issue. If the 
Supreme Court had ruled for the New York Telephone Co., it 
would have put an insurmountable burden on the F.B.I. in car-
rying out its congressional mandate. In Plum Creek, the method 
being used was the issue, and the court was not faced with a 
specific congressional mamdate. The burden on OSHA in enforc-
ing its air and noise standards has not been increased. In light of 
Noblecraft, OSHA's burden has been decreased by the court's 
willingness to accept indirect evidence' when OSHA has been 
precluded from gathering the direct and most accurate evidence 
of employer noncompliance with OSHA standards. 
Mitchell H. Miller* 
52. 29 C.F.R. § 22oo.73(a) (1978). 
53. Supra note 23. 
* Second Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law 
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II. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN LABOR LAW 
In National Steel and Shipbuilding Co. v. Occupational 
Safety and Health Review Commission, 607 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 
1979), the Ninth Circuit held a showing of bad motive was not 
necessary to support a finding of a willful violation of a safety 
standard under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 
(OSHA). 
During a routine inspection of the company's facility in 
1974, an OSHA inspector observed an employee painting inside 
the hold of an oil tanker. The employee was standing on plank-
ing approximately two feet wide, forty-five feet above the bot-
tom of the tank, and touching up blemishes as the scaffolding 
was dismantled. There were no top or side rails and the painter 
was not furnished with any type of fall protection. The Secre-
tary of Labor issued a citation for willfully violating section 
5(a)(2) of OSHA in permitting the employee to paint while on 
the unsupported scaffold, because the employer knew this condi-
tion was extremely dangerous and violated the regulation on 
scaffolding. 
Adopting the rule that "willfulness" means a conscious, in-
tentional, deliberate and voluntary decision, the Ninth Circuit 
embraced the majority definition developed in six other circuits 
which do not require a venial motive. 
The company argued that the fact it had never previously 
received a warning or citation about its scaffolding precluded a 
charge of willful violation. That contention was dismissed as ob-
literating the distinction between repeat and willful violations, 
but the court added that receipt of a prior warning or citation 
might be a factor in determining whether willfulness exists. That 
issue, however, was not before the court. 
Still unclear is whether and to what degree a good faith be-
lief in nonapplicability of a standard negates the knowledge ele-
ment of a willful charge. The company raised that issue when it 
contended that the regulation did not apply to situations in 
which scaffolding was being taken down because the absence of 
top and midrails was less dangerous to the painter than the al-
ternative of requiring quadrails would be to those workers en-
gaged in dismantling the scaffold. That good faith defense was 
inapt because the painter was not engaged in any dismantling 
13
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activity and becausH the record supported the Commission's 
finding that the company allowed its painter to work from the 
non-complaint scaffolding due to practical considerations, rather 
than any good faith belief in nonapplicability of the standard. 
In Local Joint Executive Board, AFL-CIO v. Hotel Circle 
Inc., 613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980), the court held that a receiver 
in bankruptcy lacked authority to affirm a collective bargaining 
agreement by enterlllg negotiations for its modification and ex-
tension and adopting its terms. In so holding, the court put un-
ions on notice that court approval is necessary when a long term 
collective bargaining agreement would extend beyond the term 
of receiv~rship and bind the estate. 
The court noted that a receiver has the general duty to bar-
gain and otherwise comply with the requirements of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, but that limited status as an em-
ployer does not embrace adoption of executory agreements 
without seeking court approval. 
Hotel Circle filed for bankruptcy in October 1974, and was 
operated by the debtor in possession until a receiver was ap-
pointed in July 1975. During that time, the hotel continued to 
operate under a 1973 collective bargaining agreement with the 
Union which was to expire in 1977. Mter its appointment in 
1975, the receiver sent a representative to discussions between 
the Union and the hotel's multi-employer bargaining group. In 
1975, the receiver's representative voted with other participants 
to accept a proposed wage increase and extend the life of the 
agreement. Meanwhile, the receiver negotiated a sale of the ho-
tel, contingent on the purchaser taking clear of any collective 
bargaining agreements. The bankruptcy court authorized the 
sale and, in January 1976, issued an order rejecting the collective 
bargaining agreemelrlt. 
The decision reflects a policy choice favoring the rights and 
interests of a successor employer and the flow of capital over the 
promotion of stability for employees. The court buttressed that 
argument with NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, 
Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972), and determined that requiring the 
debtor-in-possession or receiver to assume an outstanding collec-
tive bargaining agreement would place it in a worse position 
than a successor employer, which is generally not bound. The 
decision emphasized the changed status of the debtor in bank-
ruptcy and adopted the Second Circuit's reasoning that a re-
14
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ceiver is not a party to a labor agreement for purposes of resolv-
ing conflicts between the bankruptcy and labor laws. See 
Shopmen's Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc., 519 F.2d 
698 (2d Cir. 1975). 
Receivers have the power to assume executory agreements. 
Because the power to assume executory contracts is inferred 
from the bankruptcy court's power to approve rejection of such 
agreements, rather than from the Bankruptcy Act itself, the 
Ninth Circuit approved a restricted interpretation of that power. 
Although the order of appointment authorizes the receiver to 
enter into any contracts incidental and usual to the operation of 
the business, in Ninth Circuit labor law that authority now ex-
tends only to contracts "necessary to the daily operation of the 
business," 613 F.2d at 218. According to the Hotel Circle panel, 
the receiver's duty as an employer under the NLRA is limited to 
the duty to bargain and retain grievance machinery to process 
employee disputes. 
In NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 
1980), the Ninth Circuit held that the NLRB can revoke the 
subpoena of a Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service medi-
ator who has information crucial to the resolution of a factual 
dispute, solely for the purpose of preserving mediator 
effectiveness. 
Joseph Macaluso, Inc. (Company) operated four retail stores 
in Tacoma and Seattle, Washington. In 1976 the Retail Store 
Employees Union (Union) was elected the collective bargaining 
representative for the employees of Company. After several 
months of bargaining, Union and Company were unable to reach 
any agreement. Both parties then agreed to enlist the services of 
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS). Three 
meetings were held between Company and Union with an FMCS 
mediator present. 
Soon after the third meeting, Union instituted a National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) proceeding charging that Com-
pany had violated,section 8(a)(l) and (5) of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) by failing to execute the written contract 
setting forth the agreement reached by the parties during 
mediation. , 
At the NLRB hearing to determine whether or not an agree-
ment had been reached, the two Union negotiators testified that 
all the issues were settled during the first two meetings and the 
15
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third meeting was an amicable discussion explaining the agree-
ment to the Company's accountant. The two Company negotia-
tors testified that no conclusions were reached in the first two 
meetings and at the third meeting the Union negotiators walked 
out in anger. 
The Company sulbpoenaed the FMCS mediator to testify at 
the Board hearing. Pursuant to FMCS regulation 1402.2 (29 
C.F.R. section 1401.2) the FMCS mediator could not testify 
without the written permission of the Director of the. Service. 
Permission was not given. The FMCS successfully petitioned to 
revoke the subpoena on public policy grounds. The administra-
tive law judge concluded that the Union witnesses were more 
credible and held an agreement had been reached. The judge's 
conclusions were upheld on review by the NLRB. While the case 
was before the NLRB, the Company filed a declaratory judg-
ment action in distri(:t court to have the existence of a contract 
determined. The district court judge granted the Company's mo-
tion to depose the mediator; however, prior to the deposition the 
NLRB issued its ruling and the court granted summary judg-
ment against the Company. Joseph Macaluso v. Retail Store 
Employees Union Local 1001 (W.D. Wash., No. c77-67, Jan. 30, 
1978). 
The sole question on appeal was whether or not the NLRB 
has the power to reyoke the subpoena of a mediatory for the 
purpose of preserving mediator effectiveness. 
Pursuant to NLRA section 11(1), 29 U.S.C. section 161(1) 
(1970), the NLRB has the authority to revoke subpoenas when 
the evidence- required either does not relate to the subject mat-
ter or when it is n01t described with sufficient particularity. In 
reviewing the statute in the past, the Ninth Circuit has held that 
it gives the NLRB the power to revoke a subpoena on any 
grounds "consonant with the overall powers and duties of the 
NLRB." 618 F.2d at 53 (quoting General Engineering, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 341 F.2d 367; 372-73 (9th Cir. 1965». The problem 
which the court faced on appeal was whether the policy of pre-
serving mediator neutrality is outweighed by the policy that the 
public is entitled to every person's evidence. 
The court based its ruling in favor of the FMCS position on 
strong congressional policy statements in favor of FMCS neu-
trality.29 C.F.R. section 1402.2(a)(b) (1970) states that no medi-
ator may testify without the written permission of the director 
of the service. FMCS regulations all point to the essential need 
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to keep an appearance of impartiality in order to maintain the 
integrity of the service. The court also believed a controlling fac-
tor was that both parties had voluntarily engaged the services of 
the mediation service with full knowledge of its rules and 
regulations. 
In NLRB v. Adams Delivery Service, Inc., 623 F.2d 96 (9th 
Cir. 1980), the court ruled that lack of awareness by an em-
ployee that his rights to overtime pay were guaranteed by a col-
lective bargaining agreement did not mean the employee was not 
engaged in "concerted activity" within the meaning of section 7 
of the NLRA. 
Adams, a California trucking firm, hired Dennis Wilson in 
March, 1977. Under the collective bargaining agreement in force 
with the Teamsters Union Affiliate, Local No. 588, Adams was 
required to pay time and a half for all hours worked in excess of 
an eight hour day. Wilson's claims for overtime pay were con-
sistently denied by the company and Wilson's immediate super-
visor instructed him to cease reporting more than forty hours 
per week or the company would fire him. Wilson continued to 
press his claims and was fired. There were other controversies 
with the employer, but the administrative law judge found Wil-
son was discharged primarily because of the overtime contro-
versy. The Board ordered reinstatement with back pay and no 
loss of seniority rights, and the Ninth Circuit enforced the 
Board's petition. 
Earlier this term, in NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage, 614 F.2d 
1238 (9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit adopted in principle the 
Interboro doctrine that the complaint of a single employee will 
be deemed concerted activity for purposes of a collective bar-
gaining agreement or other mutual aid or protection under sec-
tion 7 of the NLRA, if motivated by the intent to enforce a pro-
vision of an existing collective bargaining agreement. The court 
declined to apply the Interboro doctrine to these facts because 
the Board found that Wilson's discharge was precipitated by his 
appeal to the Union to look into the matter. In this circuit, con-
sultation with the union for the purpose of resolving an employ-
ment controversy "is clearly something more than mere griping." 
623 F.2d at 100. The holding that an employee need not know 
with certainty that a suspected grievance is covered by the col-
lective bargaining agreement is in line with other Ninth Circuit 
decisions evincing a strong preference that established grievance 
17
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procedures be used to resolve employment disputes. 
The limits of the Interboro doctrine in the Ninth Circuit are 
revealed in NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage, 614 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 
1980)~ In Bighorn, the court of appeals enforced a bargaining or-
der because of discriminatory discharges based on union or-
ganizing activity. In an important ancillary issue, the court 
found that, absent a collective bargaining agreement which 
could be claimed as the source of employees' claimed rights, a 
single employee who filed a safety complaint was not engaged in 
protected . concerted. activity for purposes of collective 
bargaining. 
In Bighorn, the employer hired four drivers in November, 
1977. In December, two of the men discussed the desirability of 
union representation, and one-Barry Mortensen-obtained 
union membership cards. The four new employees were tempo- . 
rarily assigned work on construction of a warehouse. Operation 
of cement trucks inside the warehouse caused an accumulation 
of carbon monoxide and many employees developed severe 
headaches. Three were sickened by fumes and left work early. 
That evening, Mortensen telephoned a complaint to the Mon-
tana Department of Health and Environmental Sciences. The 
next morning, after a safety inspector had visited the site, 
Mortensen was fired. 
The Board found that Mortensen was fired because he (1) 
filed a safety complaint, and (2) had engaged in union organizing 
activities, and held both were protected concerted activities. 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the second ruling but disagreed 
that' filing of the satfety complaint constituted protected con-
certed activity. The court dismissed the Board determination in 
Alleluiah Cushion Co. Inc., 221 NLRB 999 (1975), as legal 
fiction presenting an unwarranted expansion of the definition of 
concerted action. In Alleluiah, the Board faced the idential 
problem and concluded that safe working conditions are matters 
of great and continuing concern for all workers. In Alleluiah, an 
employee who was not represented by a union, was discharged 
the day following alt} OSHA inspection. The Board accurately 
observed that permitting the discharge would indicate to other 
employees the danger of seeking assistance from federal or state 
agencies in order to obtain their statutorily guaranteed working 
conditions. 
In Bighorn, the Ninth Circuit ignored the statutory basis of 
state and federal employee health and safety legislation and 
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found that a collective bargaining agreement was essential to ~he 
Interboro fiction because it 'was the only source of the claimed 
section 7 rights under the NLRA. 
Mortensen was ordered reinstated because of his organizing 
activities. The determination that health and safety activities 
were not concerted activities was both misguided and unneces-
sary to the holding. Hopefully, the Ninth Circuit in the future 
will reexamine the implications in Bighorn for the health and 
safety of employees and construe that language as dictum. 
In NLRB v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartend-
ers' Union Local 531, 623 F.2d 61 (9th Cir., 1980), a bowling 
alley and the lessee of its on-premises coffee shop were held to 
be doing business within the meaning of the NLRA section 
8(b)(4) ban on secondary pressures. 
Verdigo Hills Bowl operates a bowling alley in Los Angeles. 
The Bowl belongs to a multi-employer bargaining group which 
entered a collective bargaining agreement with the Union. The 
source of the conflict was article 2B of the agreement which pro-
vided in part that: 
In the event that the Employer leases out or sub-
contracts out any operation or part of any opera-, 
tion which is covered by this Agreement and the 
lessee or subcontractor utilizes the services of em-
ployees performing work covered by this Agree-
ment, then this Agreement shall be applicable to 
and binding upon said lessees or subcontractors; 
provided further, that in the event the lessee or 
subcontractor fails to comply with any provisions 
of this Agreement or fails to comply with with 
any provisions of this Agreement or fails to make 
any payment set forth herein ... then the Em-
ployer shall remain liable for such failure and 
shall be obligated to make such payments. 
623 F .2d at 64. 
The Bowl employed 11 union members in a coffee shop it 
operated on its premises. In 1976, the Bowl leased the coffee 
shop to three successive lessees. The third lease contained a pro-
vision that the lessee agreed that all employees shall be mem-
bers of the local culinary union. The lessee failed to meet this 
condition and also failed to remain open during certain specified 
hours. The Bowl served eviction notice and subsequently initi-
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ated an unlawful detainer action. 
The union argued! unsuccessfully that section 8(e) of the 
NLRA was not violated because (1) the Bowl was not doing bus-
iness with its lessees 'within the meaning of that provision and 
(2) Article 2B was a valid work preservation clause. 
Outright sale of BtSSets does not create a "doing business" 
relationship under section 8(e) and the Union contended that 
the lease was essentially a disposition of capital. The court relied 
on the Bowl's retention of an interest in the property and condi-
tions the Bowl placed on its use to distinguish the lease from a 
sale. It found the "doing business" requirement. in the landlord-
tenant relationship, the location of both businesses on the same 
premises, and the catering to each other's clientele so that the 
success of one business impacted on the success of the other. 
The power of the Bowl to terminate the lease meant that the 
Bowl was susceptible to pressure from the Union. This in turn 
was used to justify invalidating Article 2B. 
That provision was held not a valid work preservation 
clause because it went beyond setting economic standards and 
attempted to require specific Union affiliation. 
The court never satisfactorily explained why, if the lease 
was not a sufficient divestment of capital to constitute a sale, 
and if the Bowl retained control over the hours and prices of the 
coffee shop, the lease should not be seen as the subcontracting 
out of an operation. The court was apparently convinced that 
the Union's objective was the unionization of the Bowl's lessees 
r~ther than influencirlg the labor policy of the Bowl itself. That 
argument overlooks the fact that, prior to the time the leases 
were entered into, the coffee shop was run by the Bowl and 
staffed with union employees. There is nothing in the record to 
indicate that there was any significant change in the hours, oper-
ation products or priices after the coffee shop was leased. The 
only discernible difference was the tendency of lessees to hire 
nonunion employees. In short, this decision simply encourages 
limited divestment of specific operations-while retaining over-
all control-for the purpose of undermining union majority sta-
tus or circumvention of recognition of certified representatives. 
In Allied Concrete Inc. v. NLRB. 607 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 
1979), the Ninth Circuit held that picketing a concrete subcon-
tractor' at the job site was an illegal secondary boycott under 
sections 8(b)(4)(i) and 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) ~f the NLRA because the 
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striking employees could have limited their picketing to the one 
gate at the construction project which was reserved solely for the 
struck employer. 
AlliecJ is an Arizona corporation engaged in the ready mix 
concrete business. In 1976, Allied was a subcontractor to Ashton 
Co., Inc., the general contractor for construction of highway 
overpasses on Interstate 10, outside of Phoenix. Allied's collec-
tive bargaining agreement with Teamster's Local No. 83 expired 
on May 31, 1976. The union struck against Allied on June 27, 
1976. In July 1976, one day before Allied was scheduled to make 
a delivery of concrete to the Ashton job site, Allied posted signs 
at the three entrances to the construction site. One sign reserved 
one gate which was 300 yards east of, but visible from the pour 
site, exclusively for Allied. On two occasions, vehicles containing 
picketers accompanied the Allied truck and followed it through 
the gate. At the pour site, five striking employees got out of their 
vehicles and picketed the truck. On both occasions all Ashton 
employees walked off the job and the Allied truck left without 
unloading. Ashton subsequently cancelled its contract with 
Allied. 
Picketing in the construction industry has been subject to 
special, restrictive rules since Building and Construction Trades 
.. Council of New Orleans, 155 NLRB 319 (1965), a!f'd sub nom., 
Markwell and Hartz v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. 
denied, 391 U.S.' 914 (1968). The picketing against Allied fell 
within the guidelines for common situs construction projects as 
set down in Sailors Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock), 92 
NLRB 547 (1950). Moore Dry Dock established a four-part test 
to judge the legality of common situs picketing. The two rele-
vant considerations where (a) whether the picketing takes place 
reasonably close to the situs, and (b) whether the picketing 
clearly discloses that the dispute is only with the primary 
employer. 
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the picketing d~d not 
exceed the Moore Dry Dock test. This circuit, however, views 
the Moore Dry Dock rule as only an evidentiarY tool, and fo-
cuses its inquiry On the object of the picketing. Pressure directed 
only at the primary employer may be lawful even though neutral 
secondary employers are involved; conversely, where the object 
is to involve neutral or secondary employers to pressure the pri-
mary, that activity is unlawful. 
In Allied, the only way for the picketers to effectively pres-
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sure the primary emplo,yer was to follow his trucks and picket 
those trucks at the roving job site. The court was' unpersuaded 
of the necessity for that because of the reserved gate 300 yards 
from the pour site. The court buttressed its position with the 
Fifth Circuit rule that the picketing union do everything reason-
ably necessary to insur(~ that secondary employees are not mis-
led or coerced into observing the picket line. 
It is commonly understood that all picketing involves secon-
dary employees to some extent; that does not by itself make the 
activity illegal. The court's reliance on the presence of the re-
serve gate as providing a reasonable alternative is a further re-
striction on the economic power of construction unions. The case 
has potentially greater significance. The requirement of limiting 
picketing to the reserve gates' will probably be restricted to con-
struction projects. The Fifth Circuit rule, apparently adopted, 
will place a heavy burden on picketing unions in general to con-
vince the trier of fact that the picketing was conducted in a 
manner least likely to encourage secondary effects. 
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